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1 Introduction
More than 50 years ago Marschak and Andrews (1944) showed that production function
regressions generate inconsistent parameter estimates because optimal supply and factor
inputs are jointly determined by unobservable diﬀerences in eﬃciency across firms. The
problem with regressions on firm level data has haunted studies of eﬃciency and producer
behavior ever since; see Griliches and Mairesse (1998) for a survey. In this paper, we
propose an econometric model that explicitly uses the full system of equations derived
from optimizing supply and factor demands to overcome this problem. The empirical
model allows us to explore the origins of the eﬃciency diﬀerences across firms.
Eﬃciency diﬀerences are decomposed into stochastic, firm-specific (idiosyncratic) cu-
mulated innovations as emphasized e.g. by Ericson and Pakes (1995), and permanent
eﬃciency diﬀerences as emphasized by Jovanovic (1982) and others1. In the four high-
tech industries that we examine, the eﬃciency diﬀerences are largely permanent, while
cumulated innovations play a lesser role.
A large literature on firm heterogeneity has focused on firm performance as measured
by size (sales or employment), including Pakes and Ericson (1998). However, most recent
studies of diﬀerences in firm performance have focused on diﬀerences in eﬃciency. In
competitive environments, diﬀerences in size and eﬃciency should be closely related as
more eﬃcient firms will tend to be larger, see e.g. Demsetz (1973), Lucas (1978), and
Jovanovic (1982). Our structural model highlights the positive relationship between size
and eﬃciency, while also emphasizing that the fixity of capital is essential in explaining
diﬀerences in firm sizes.
We use the term eﬃciency rather than productivity, since economic theory does not
predict an unambigous relationship between diﬀerences in labor productivity and dif-
ferences in eﬃciency: Consider firms with diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency competing in a
frictionless industry. A firm with high eﬃciency will choose a high level of labor input so
that its marginal product is equal to the real wage, which, by assumption, is the same
across all firms2. With a Cobb-Douglas production function, the marginal product is pro-
portional to production per factor input, and, hence, all firms should have the same level
1Appendix D gives a survey of theoretical models focusing on firm heterogeneity.
2We assume diminishing returns to scale for profit-maximization to be well defined.
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of production per factor input apart from transient noise or fluctuations. This argument
raises the question of how to make inferences about diﬀerences in eﬃciency from firm level
data, which is a central theme in our analysis.
Our empirical framework decomposes the observations of firm-level supply and factor
demands in terms of four types of latent components: (i) firm-specific permanent com-
ponents, (ii) firm-specific stochastic trends, (iii) transient noise, and (iv) industry-wide
fluctuations. The multivariate framework imposes few restrictions on the data generating
process a priori and allows us to consider the validity of restrictions imposed by formal
economic models. Our empirical model explicitly accounts for sample self-selection caused
by firm exit.
2 A first look at diﬀerences in firm performance
How should one measure diﬀerences in firm performance, and do these diﬀerences increase
with firm age? Using size as a measure of firm performance, we approach the second
question by examining Figure 13. The figure presents the mean and interquartile range
of log sales as a function of firm age among firms established during 1993-2002. All
observations are measured relative to industry-year averages at the two digit NACE level.
Not surprisingly, the figure shows that young firms are substantially smaller than older
firms: the average size of eight year old firms is 25 percent lower than the industry average,
and firm growth tends to decelerate with age. More interestingly, the figure shows that
the interquartile range is almost independent of firm age, indicating that the magnitude
of firm heterogeneity is unrelated to size.
The upper graph in Figure 2 displays the correlation coeﬃcient between log sales in
the firms’ first year and in their subsequent years. The correlation coeﬃcient for the first
and second year is 0.92, and it declines slowly during the subsequent years. This shows
that the relative diﬀerences in firm size are highly persistent as firms become older.
These patterns indicate that diﬀerences across young firms are as large as those among
older firms and that the diﬀerences are highly persistent. However, this conclusion is
preliminary as it leaves open a number of questions. Young firms have a high rate of
3Figures 1-2 are based on a comprehensive, unbalanced sample of firm level observations from four
high-tech manufacturing industries, as discussed in Section 6.
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exit; on average, 40 percent of a new cohort of firms have exited within eight years in our
sample. Since exiting firms are systematically selected among the least successful firms,
we expect an upward trend in average log sales, as confirmed by Figure 1. Systematic
selection that eliminates the least successful firms should also, cet.par., tend to narrow
down the diﬀerences in firm size. However, there is no evidence of this in the figure.
There seems to be an oﬀsetting force that tends to make firms grow more unequal with
age. Such an oﬀsetting force could be idiosyncratic, cumulated shocks that would also
explain the declining correlation between a firm’s performance in its first year and in its
subsequent years, as depicted in Figure 2.
Labor productivity is another widely used measure of firm performance. Figure 3
presents the mean and interquartile range of log labor productivity as a function of firm
age, where labor productivity is measured as value added per man hour4. We see that
the patterns are rather diﬀerent from those in Figure 1. There is no upward trend in
labor productivity and the interquartile range declines with age. The diﬀerence between
sales and labor productivity is equally clear from the lower graph in Figure 2, which
displays the correlation coeﬃcient between labor productivity in the firms’ first year and
in their subsequent years5. The correlation coeﬃcient between productivity in the first
and second year is only 0.40, which indicate that 60 percent of the observed variance in log
labor productivity is due to temporary fluctuations or noise in the data. A comparison of
the two graphs in Figure 2 raises the question of why diﬀerences in size are considerably
more persistent than diﬀerences in labor productivity.
The results in Figure 1 and 2 are in good agreement with Baumol andWolﬀ (1984), who
showed that many commonly used output-input ratios fail to pick up eﬃciency diﬀerences
in a competitive equilibrium where all firms have zero profit. However, we seem to be
at odds with a host of empirical studies on micro data; e.g. Baily, Hulten and Campell
(1992), who studied U.S. manufacturing data; and more recently Foster, Haltiwanger and
Kirzan (2002), who examined U.S. retail trade data. These, and many other papers,
report a high degree of persistence in measured labor productivity.
4Value added is a real income measure, defined as (ptQt −wmt Mt), where pt is the output price, wmt is
the price of material inputs, Qt is output, and Mt is material inputs. All prices are real prices obtained
by applying a common deflator.
5Figures 1-3 focus on heterogeneity in new cohorts of firms. Similar patterns of heterogeneity and
autocorrelation are also present among older and larger firms. E.g. high and low degrees of persistence
in diﬀerences in revenues and labor productivity, respectively, are not restricted to the firms’ early years.
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We suspect that the discrepancies between diﬀerent empirical studies is due mainly to
the choice of measurement method: While we use man hours, most published studies use
number of employees as (a proxy for) labor input. In fact, data on sales per employee shows
that Norwegian data are not atypical: the correlation coeﬃcient in log sales per employee
between the firm’s first and second year (subtracting annual industry-wide eﬀects) is 0.77,
decreasing to 0.51 after eight years6. This suggests that a firm’s adjustment of number of
employees is much slower than its adjustment of man hours.
3 A structural model of firm behavior
Section 3.1 presents a simple model of supply and factor demand based on standard as-
sumptions of price taking behavior and Hicks-neutral technical change. This model is
extended in Section 3.2, to allow heterogeneous prices and labor augmenting innovations.
The structural models provide the theoretical foundation for the econometric framework
that we later use to make inferences about unobserved diﬀerences in eﬃciency from ob-
served sales and factor costs.
3.1 A model of firm supply and factor demand
Assume that firm i has the production function:
Qit = AitK
γ
i,t−1 F (Mit, Lit) , (1)
where Qit and Ait denote firm i’s output and eﬃciency in year t, Ki,t−1 is the predeter-
mined capital stock at the beginning of year t (i.e. end of t − 1), and F (Mit, Lit) is a
function aggregating the two fully flexible production factors materials, Mit, and labor
inputs, Lit. The aggregation function is homogenous of degree ε, with elasticity of scale
γ + ε < 1. Given that the firms face the same price of output, pt, materials, wmt , and
labor, wlt, it follows that the short-run cost-function has the form:
C(Qit, Ki,t−1) = c(Wt)

Qit
AitK
γ
i,t−1
1/ε
, (2)
where c(Wt) is a function that is homogeneous of degree one in Wt ≡

wlt, w
m
t

. Setting
price equal to marginal costs, we obtain the following set of equations for sales, Sit ≡ ptQit,
6If value added is used as output measure, the corresponding figures become 0.58 and 0.50, respectively.
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and short-run factor demand:
⎡
⎣
lnSit
lnMit
lnLit
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣
(1− ε)−1
(1− ε)−1
(1− ε)−1
⎤
⎦ lnAit +
⎡
⎣
γ (1− ε)−1
γ (1− ε)−1
γ (1− ε)−1
⎤
⎦ lnKi,t−1 + g(Pt), (3)
where g(Pt) is a vector function that only depends on the price vector Pt ≡ (pt,Wt). The
resulting short-run profit function is homogeneous in capital:
Π(Ait, Ki,t−1, Pt) = π(Pt) (AitKγi,t−1)1/(1−ε)
≡ ΠitKγ/(1−ε)i,t−1 . (4)
According to (3), diﬀerences in firm output, material use and labor input are infor-
mative about unobserved diﬀerences in firm eﬃciency, conditional on the firms’ capital
stocks. However, the equations in (3) cannot be directly exploited to make inferences
about the diﬀerences in eﬃciency, as these tend to be (positively) correlated with diﬀer-
ences in capital.
Capital stock dynamics: We shall next consider the capital stock dynamics derived
from assumptions about firms’ investment behavior. Assume that the multiplicative factor
Πit in (4) is a Markovian stochastic process and that the adjustment costs of capital are
weakly convex due to partial irreversibilities7. Then we can use results from Bloom (2000)
and Bloom et al. (2001), who demonstrate that the actual capital stock at the beginning
of year t, Ki,t−1, and the hypothetical frictionless capital stock, K∗i,t−1, will have the same
long run growth rate. That is:
lnKi,t−1 = lnK
∗
i,t−1 + error, (5)
where the error term is stationary. To be more specific, K∗i,t−1 is the capital stock the firm
would choose if the marginal revenue of capital, i.e. the derivative of Π(Ait, Ki,t−1, Pt)
with respect to Ki,t−1, is equal to the Joergensonian user cost.
It is easy to see from (4) that lnK∗i,t−1 must be linear in lnAit. A first order approxi-
mation to a general equilibrium correction model is therefore:
7Adjustment costs may also apply to labor input. However, there can be no doubt that labor is a
much more flexible production factor than fixed capital, which, due to large transaction costs and lack of
well-functioning second hand markets for many types of capital, often have low alternative value outside
its current use or location. In contrast, the costs of adjusting man hours are comparably small in the
Norwegian labor market.
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∆ lnKit = (φ− 1)(lnKi,t−1 − κA lnAit) + κt, (6)
where |φ| < 1,κA is a fixed parameter and κt is an industry-wide time varying intercept8.
Even in the presence of kinks in the adjustment cost function due to partial irre-
versibilities, investments tend to be relatively smooth at the firm level when only one
type of aggregate capital is considered. This is well documented both on Norwegian and
international data sets9 and motivates a smooth error correction model like (6) to describe
the short-run dynamics of capital formation.
Supply and factor demand: Combining (3) and (6), we obtain a simultaneous system
of equations:
yit = θA lnAi1 + θA ln(Ait/Ai1) + θK ln (Ki,t−1) + θt, (7)
where
yit ≡

lnSit, lnMit, lnLit, lnKit

θA =

1
1−ε ,
1
1−ε ,
1
1−ε , (1− φ)κA

θK =
 γ
1−ε ,
γ
1−ε ,
γ
1−ε , φ

θt =

g(Pt)
, κt

. (8)
The structural model (7)-(8) suggests that diﬀerences between firms in the endoge-
nous variables, yit, are due to diﬀerences in eﬃciency, ln (Ait), and capital accumulation,
ln (Ki,t−1). Equation (7) decomposes diﬀerences in eﬃciency into two components: perma-
nent diﬀerences already introduced when the firms are established, lnAi1, and diﬀerences
in subsequent innovations, i.e. the cumulated changes in eﬃciency, ln (Ait/Ai1).
3.2 An extended model: Idiosyncracies in prices and labor pro-
ductivity.
The model (7)-(8) puts heavy constraints on the data as it assumes that eﬃciency
changes aﬀect all the components of yit through a single latent variable, Ait, and that
8Much of the recent theory on investment behavior focuses either on partial irreversibilities; i.e. the
resale price of capital is lower than the purchasing price (e.g. Caballero et al., 1995; Abel and Eberly,
1996) or on fixed adjustment costs (e.g. Caballero and Engel, 1999). The model of Bloom (2000) builds
on the first strand of this literature, allowing weakly convex adjustment costs that are kinked at zero due
to partial irreversibilities.
9See Bond et al. (2001) and Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003).
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the three first components of the loading vector, θA, are equal. Moreover, according
to (4), short-run profitability is increasing in eﬃciency Ait and capital Ki,t−1. On the
other hand, (3) shows that diﬀerences in labor productivity, i.e. value added per labor
input (ptQit − wmt Mit) /Lit, are independent of diﬀerences in firm eﬃciency, Ait. The last
implication is, of course, not invariant with respect to the choice of production function.
Although common in empirical work, the production function (1) and the assumption
of price taking behavior are quite restrictive. We will therefore consider an alternative
specification, which will lead to an extension of the system of supply and factor de-
mand (7). This specification incorporates heterogeneous prices as well as biased technical
change.
Assume monopolistic competition between a large number of producers of a diﬀeren-
tiated good, where each producer faces a demand function of the form:
Qit = Φitp
−e
it ,
where Φit is a demand shift parameter and e is the demand elasticity, e > 1. Each firm
has a production function of the type (1), except that the aggregation function F (·, ·)
is firm-time specific, denoted Fit (·, ·). To be able to identify the latent variables of the
model from data on sales and factor demand, we shall confine the analysis to a special
case:
Fit(Mit, Lit) = [(bitLit)
ρ +Mρit]
"
ρ ,with ρ < 1. (9)
That is, a CES function with a labor augmenting parameter bit and substitution parameter
ρ. The corresponding cost function is:
Cit(Qit, Ki,t−1) = cit

Qit
AitK
γ
i,t−1
1/ε
(10)
where
cit =
k
(wlt/bit)
ρ
ρ−1 + (wmt )
ρ
ρ−1
l ρ−1
ρ
.
The profit maximizing system of sales and (short-run) factor demand equations (ignoring
additive constants) is:
⎡
⎣
lnSit
lnMit
lnLit
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣
e−1
ε+e−eε −
ε(e−1)
ε+e−eε 0
e−1
ε+e−eε −
ε(e−1)
ε+e−eε +
ρ
1−ρ 0
e−1
ε+e−eε −
ε(e−1)
ε+e−eε +
ρ
1−ρ
ρ
1−ρ
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎣
lnA∗it
ln cit
ln bit
⎤
⎦+ 1 γ (e− 1)ε+ e− eε lnKi,t−1, (11)
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where
A∗it = Φ
1/(e−1)
it Ait.
The system (11) has three linearly independent factors; lnA∗it, ln cit and ln bit. The latter
two factors will be negatively correlated, since cit — which can be interpreted as a variable
factor price index — is a monotonically decreasing function of bit for given factor prices
(wlt, w
m
t ).We see that labor productivity will depend on ln cit and ln bit, but not on lnA
∗
it.
The main structure of our demand and supply equations is not aﬀected by the as-
sumption of monopolistic competition: Eﬃciency and demand changes, due to e.g. qual-
ity diﬀerences, enter the system of equations (11) in an entirely symmetric way through
the variable A∗it. Consequently, we are not able to distinguish between these two types of
shocks in the empirical analysis. We may think of A∗it as as eﬃciency in a wide-sense, as
it incorporates demand idiosyncracies. Since
(e− 1)
ε+ e− eε →
1
1− ε and A
∗
it → Ait when e→∞,
a model with price taking firms is obtained as a limiting case of (11).
The eﬀects of a labor augmenting innovation, i.e. a positive chock in bit, depends
on the substitution parameter ρ. There are three main cases: If ρ < 0, a positive shock
in bit will lead to an increase in the ratio of materials to labor input. That is to say,
the innovation is “labor saving” (see Binswanger, 1974). On the other hand, if ρ > 0, a
labor augmenting innovation leads to a more labor intensive production. Finally, when
ρ = 0 (or formally: ρ→ 0) the loading coeﬃcient of ln bit becomes zero, while cit becomes
a Cobb-Douglas function in the two arguments qL/bit and qMt. Thus bit reduces to a
Hicks-neutral eﬃciency shock indistinguishable from Ait.10
The short run profit function corresponding to (11) is homogeneous in capital. Fur-
thermore, it is easy to cheque that frictionless capital, K∗i,t−1, has the form:
lnK∗i,t−1 = κA lnA∗it + κc ln cit + κt,
for fixed parameters κA and κc and a time varying intercept κt. Therefore, using (5) in
combination with a first order error correction model, as in (6), the complete system of
10In the limiting case it is useful to include a share parameter, ν, in the CES function: Fit(Mit, Lit) =
[ν(bitLit)ρ + (1− ν)Mρit]
ε
ρ → (bitLit)vεM(1−ν)εit
10
equations for the extended model can be written:
yit = θAαi1 + θA (αit −αi1) + θK ln (Ki,t−1) + θt (12)
where
αit =

lnA∗it ln cit ln bit

θA =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
e−1
ε+e−eε −
ε(e−1)
ε+e−eε 0
e−1
ε+e−eε −
ε(e−1)
ε+e−eε +
ρ
1−ρ 0
e−1
ε+e−eε −
ε(e−1)
ε+e−eε +
ρ
1−ρ
ρ
1−ρ
(1− φ)κA (1− φ)κc 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
θK =
k
γ(e−1)
ε+e−eε ,
γ(e−1)
ε+e−eε ,
γ(e−1)
ε+e−eε , φ
l
(13)
and θt is a time-varying intercept vector.
Without further restrictions, it is not possible to disentangle the eﬀects of Hicks-
neutral eﬃciency or demand shocks on the one hand and the eﬀects of labor augmenting
innovations on the other. The reason is that if the vector of latent factors αit in (12) is
premultiplied with any 3× 3 matrix R, we obtain an observationally equivalent model by
postmultiplying the loading coeﬃcient matrix θA with R−1. As we discuss in Section 4,
one restriction is needed in addition to the particular structure of θA in (13) to obtain
identification: namely that the innovations ∆ lnA∗it and (∆ ln cit,∆ ln bit) are mutually
independent vectors.
A main feature of the extended model (12) is that it may be able to account for
persistent of labor productivity diﬀerences, as exhibited in Figure 2. There are, of course,
other explanations for such diﬀerences. One possibility is the presence of overhead labor.
That is, each firm has a minimum amount of labor which is necessary in order to operate,
regardless of the level of output; see Aghion and Howitt (1994). Overhead labor creates
productivity diﬀerences, because labor inputs below the threshold have zero marginal
product. One can show that labor productivity will be positively correlated with eﬃciency
and negatively correlated with the threshold. While the assumption of overhead labor
may motivate the use of labor productivity as a measure (or proxy) for eﬃciency; as in
Haltiwanger et al. (2002), the explanatory power of this theory is weak when overhead
labor makes up a small share of total labor input. In fact, there are reasons to believe
that this is the case in manufacturing: When sales increase in the presence of overhead
labor, we would expect an increase in labor productivity due to a positive scale eﬀect.
11
However, no such pattern is visible in Figure 3, contrary to what we would expect from
the positive relation between firm size and firm age depicted in Figure 1.
In the next section we will formulate a general econometric model that encompasses
the simple model (7)-(8) with price taking behavior, as well as the extended model (11).
4 The econometric model
In this section we formulate our econometric model. This model imposes fewer restrictions
on the data generating process than our structural models. We assume that:
yit = vi + ait + θK lnKi,t−1 + θt + eit, τ i ≤ t ≤ T, (14)
where
ait =

0 t = τ i
ai,t−1 + ηit t = τ i + 1, ..., T,
(15)
0 denotes a matrix of zeros of appropriate dimension, and vi,ηit and eit are 4-dimensional
vectors that are assumed to have independent, multivariate normal distributions:
vi ∼ IN (0,Σv), ηit ∼ IN (0,Ση), eit ∼ IN (0,Σe). (16)
We have an unbalanced panel data set, where firm i is observed from year τ i ≥ 1 until
Ti ≤ T , where τ i is the date of the firm’s birth. The birth dates τ i have an exogenous
distribution, while the exit dates Ti can be endogenous.
When interpreting equation (14) in view of the structural equation (7), the term ait
corresponds to θA ln (Ait/Ai1) and vi corresponds to θA ln (Ai1). On the other hand, in
view of the extended model (12), ait can be interpreted as θA (αit −αi1) and vi as θAαi1.
All transient shocks and measurement errors are captured by eit, while all industry wide
eﬀects are captured by the intercept vector θt. It may seem restrictive to assume that
ait is a random walk, but our results are robust towards moderate departures from the
random walk assumption; for example if the ait process is slightly mean reverting, as
suggested by Blundell and Bond (1999, 2000).
The structure of the covariance matrices are essential for the interpretation and identi-
fication of the model (14)-(16), which encompasses some well-known econometric models
of firm heterogeneity as special cases: If Ση = 0 , we obtain the fixed eﬀect model widely
used to account for firm heterogeneity in the econometric panel data literature. When
12
Σe = 0, the model is consistent with Gibrat’s law discussed by Sutton (1997), where firm
growth from period t − 1 to t is independent of the level in period t − 1. On the other
hand, when Σe is a non-zero matrix, the model (14)-(16) implies ”mean reversion”, in the
sense that any component of ∆yit will be negatively correlated with the corresponding
component of yi,t−111.
A crucial point is whether the parameters of the covariance matrices are identified.
Consider a sample covering two years; t = 1, 2. From (14)-(16), ignoring capital for
simplicity, we have:
Cov (yit,yis) =

Σv +Ση [min (t, s)− 1] t 9= s
Σv +Ση(t− 1) +Σe t = s.
(17)
We then obtain: Cov(yi2,yi1) = Σv, Cov(yi1,yi1) = Σv +Σe, and Cov(yi2,yi2) = Σv +
Ση +Σe.
Identification and testing of structural restrictions: As mentioned, there are no
a priori constraints (apart from positive semi-definiteness) on the covariance matrices Σv
andΣη in our general econometric model (14)-(16). We shall now consider the restrictions
imposed by our structural models.
Let us first examine the single-factor model: According to (7)-(8), Σv and Ση can be
factorized as:
Σv = θAθA  V ar (lnAi1)
Ση = θAθA  V ar [ln (Ait/Ai1)] , (18)
where we, for simplicity of notation, have assumed that τ i = 1. It should be noted that
we cannot identify θA, since the variances in (18) are unknown.
If (18) holds, the rank of Ση is 1, and all components of the vector ηit are determined
by a single latent factor, say zit:
ηit = Γηzit, with zit ∼ IN (0, 1), (19)
where Γη is a 4× 1 vector such that Ση = ΓηΓη . From (15) and (19):
ait = Γη
t[
s=2
zis for t > 1. (20)
11Friedman (1993) has emphasized that noise and temporary fluctuations in the data often mislead
researchers to infer convergence across the units of observations when there is no convergence in the
underlying, uncontaminated processes of interest. See also Quah (1993).
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Similarly, vi can be expressed by a single latent factor zi1:
vi = Γvzi1, with zi1 ∼ IN (0, 1), (21)
where Γη is a 4 × 1 vector such that Σv = ΓvΓv . From the definition of θA in (16),
a testable implication of this structural model is that the first three components within
each vector Γη and Γv should be equal.
Preceding a test of the structure of Γη and Γv, we must examine a more basic question:
How well does a model with only one latent factor - i.e. where the rank of Σv and Ση
is one - fit the data compared to a more general model with several latent factors? In
particular, we would like to compare with the extended model (11), which implies that
the rank of both Σv and Ση is equal to three.
First, consider a Ση-matrix with general rank r. The innovations ηit can then be
represented as:
ηit = Γηzit, with zit ∼ IN (0, Ir), (22)
where Γη = [γηij ]4×r is a 4×r matrix such that Ση = ΓηΓη , zit is an r-dimensional random
vector and Ir is the identity matrix of order r. Similarly, we can express vi as:
vi = Γvzi1, with zi1 ∼ IN (0, Ir),
where Γv = [γvij]4×r and Σv = ΓvΓv . If the single-factor model is correct, r = 1, and we
expect that the largest eigenvalue of the estimated covariance matrices eΣη and eΣv should
be large relative to the others.
An interesting question, which we now will address, is whether we can identify the
parameters θA in the extended model (12) from Γη: Let σ2A∗, σ2c , and σ2b denote the
variance of ∆ lnA∗it, ∆ ln cit, and ∆ ln bit, respectively, and define:
S =
⎡
⎣
σA∗ 0 0
0 σc 0
0 0 σb
⎤
⎦ , (23)
which — of course — cannot be identified. Let σcb =corr(∆ ln cit,∆ ln bit), with σcb < 0
(labor augmenting innovations reduce variable factor costs). Then, if Γη have the following
structure:
Γη =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
γ1 γ2 0
γ1 γ3 0
γ1 γ4 γ5
γ6 γ7 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (24)
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with γ1 > 0, γ2 < 0 and where ∆ lnA∗it and (∆ ln cit,∆ ln bit) are mutually independent,
the following holds:
Γηzit = θA∆αit
Dzit = S
−1∆αit
ΓηD
−1 = θAS, (25)
where
D =
⎡
⎣
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 σcb
s
1− σ2cb
⎤
⎦ (26)
is uniquely identified from Γη . Equations (25)-(26) say that we can identify the standard-
ized innovations S−1∆αit from zit (any non-zero mean of ∆αit is absorbed into θt) and
the structural coeﬃcients θA from Γη — except for postmultiplication with the unknown
diagonal matrix S. That is, each column of θA is identified up to an unknown scaling
factor. A proof of (25)-(26) is found in Appendix B.
A general 4×4 covariance matrix Ση with rank 3 has a minimal representation: Ση =
ΓηΓη
 where Γη is a 4 × 3 matrix with zeros above the diagonal, and therefore contains
9 free parameters. On the other hand, the specification of Γη in (24) contains 7 free
parameters. Thus there are two overidentifying restrictions embedded in (25)-(26), which
we will subject to statistical testing in Section 7.
Attrition: A question that we need to address is how we should account for sample
attrition? Since attrition may be caused by an exit decision that depends on a firm’s
eﬃciency, this problem is potentially important in our case.
We propose a simultaneous equation model which is an extension of the model due to
Heckman (1978): Suppose that uit is a latent variable related to the net value of the firm
such that when uit > 0 the firm will continue to operate, while when uit < 0 it is decided
to close down the firm. Hence, we define an indicator variable, χit, such that χit = 1 if
uit > 0 and χit = −1 if uit < 0.
Our reduced form model of attrition has the following form:
uit = γ A(vi + ai,t+1) + γ xxit + γt + hεit
χit = sign(uit)
t = 1, ..., Ti, (27)
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where γA, γx, γt are unknown parameters, xit is a vector of observed variables up until
t, and hεit is normally distributed. Note that under the structural single-factor model
(7), γ A(vi + ai,t+1) is proportional to lnAi,t+1 for any vector γA (which therefore is not
identified). In this case, (27) says that a firm will exit at the beginning of year t+1 if its
eﬃciency, Ai,t+1, falls short of a threshold depending on observed variables, xit. A similar
exit rule was derived by Olley and Pakes (1996). In their model, γ xxit is a polynomial in
investment and capital, meant to approximate a general, unknown function.
The classical Marshallian exit rule provides a motivation for our model specification,
and some guidance with respect to which variables to include in xit. According to Marshall
(1966, p. 349), ”production is likely to come to a sharp stop” when ”the price falls so
low that it does not pay for the out of pocket expenses.” An interpretation of this
statement is that the probability of firm exit increases as the short-run profit function,
Π(Ai,t+1, Kit, Pt+1), decreases relative to the capital costs:
Π(Ai,t+1,Kit, Pt+1) < e
−hεit(r + δ)qK,t+1Kit, (28)
where hεit is the error term, r is the interest rate and δ is the depreciation rate of capital.
If the profit function is homogeneous in Ai,t+1 and Kit with diminishing returns to scale,
we obtain, after taking logarithms of both sides of (28), an equation of the form (27) with
xit = lnKit.
The equations (27) should be considered as a reduced form expression; a statistical
model which enables us to predict attrition, not to explain it. Thus we are in line with
Abowd et al. (2001), who propose a flexible statistical approach to the sample self-
selection problem which do not rely on formal economic modelling of the decisions which
cause attrition. In accordance with their line of argument, we can think of (27) as an
auxiliary model whose parameters are not of interest per se, but which enables us to control
for self-selection bias when making inferences about the structural model. However, in
contrast to Abowd et al. (2001) our model of attrition does not rely on the missing
at random (MAR) assumption,12 and therefore entails some demanding computational
challenges which we address in Appendix A.
12The missing at random (MAR) condition says that information about whether the firm is operative
in year t+ 1 should not help us to predict yi,t+1, given the history of the observed variables: yi1, ...,yit.
See Little and Rubin (1987); and Moﬃtt, Fitzgerald and Gottschalk (1999). The latter authors refer to
the MAR condition as ”selection on observables”.
16
The likelihood function: We will here outline how we can arrive at a convenient ex-
pression for the likelihood function. Estimation issues are considered in detail in Appendix
A.
We first note that if τ i = 1, we can substitute for vi + ai,t+1 in (27), using (14) and
the fact that ai,t+1 = ait + Γηzi,t+1, to obtain the following representation of our model:
yi1 = θK lnKi,0 + θ1 + Γvzi1 + ei1
∆yit = θK∆ lnKi,t−1 +∆θt + Γηzit + eit − ei,t−1, t = 2, 3, ...
uit = γ Ayit + γ xxit + γt + εit, t = 1, 2, ...
χit = sign(uit), t = 1, 2, ... (29)
with
εit = hεit + γ A(Γηzi,t+1 − eit), (30)
and Var(εit) = 1 by normalization. Furthermore, γx, xit, and γt have been redefined so
as to be consistent with the transformation from (27) and (14) into (29); in particular,
xit is augmented with lnKi,t−1. We see from (30) that εit may be correlated with both eit
and zi,t+1: ⎛
⎝
eit
zi,t+1
εit
⎞
⎠ ∼ IN
⎛
⎝0,
⎡
⎣
Σe 0 λ
0 I ρ
λ  ρ 1
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠ .
In Appendix A it is shown that we can utilize properties of the multivariate normal
distribution to obtain an explicit expression for the joint density of {yi1, ...,yiTi,χi,Ti},
although the maximization of the likelihood function requires simulation methods. An
interesting special case is obtained when λ = 0 and ρ = 0. Then the MAR condition holds
and a relatively simple closed form (partial) likelihood function can be derived. In our
experience, maximization of the partial likelihood function (under the MAR assumption)
provides excellent starting values when estimating the unrestricted model, even when λ
or ρ are significantly diﬀerent from zero.
5 Why do firms diﬀer in eﬃciency?
Our econometric framework allows us to decompose diﬀerences in eﬃciency and to quantify
the relative importance of permanent diﬀerences and cumulated innovations. In view of
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our econometric model (14), a natural measure of the importance of permanent diﬀerences
relative to idiosyncratic innovations in a given cohort of firms, say with age T , is:
VT ≡
tr V ar(vi)
tr V ar(aiT )
=
tr Σv
(T − 1)tr Ση
. (31)
In the single-factor model (7), VT reduces to
VT =
V ar(lnAi1)
V ar(ln(AiT/Ai1))
=
σ2v
(T − 1)σ2η
,
where σ2v and σ2η are the (non-zero) eigenvalues of Σv and Ση, respectively.
The measure VT defined in (31) ignores endogenous exit, which will tend to reduce
the variance both in vi and aiT . Hence, we focus on a modified version of (31): Let MT
denote the set of firms born in year 1 that are still operative in year T . We define the
conditional variance ratio, CVT , as
CVT ≡
tr V ar(vi|i ∈MT )
tr V ar(aiT |i ∈MT ) . (32)
Thus, while VT is computed from the unconditional distribution of the latent vari-
ables, CVT is calculated from their conditional distribution given survival. Of course, it
is impossible to obtain a closed form expression for CVT , but it is straightforward to sim-
ulate data from our joint model of sales, factor demand and attrition, and thus generate
random numbers from the distribution of vi and aiT conditional on survival. The condi-
tional distribution depends on the initial distribution of capital, Ki1. Analogous to what
is done in bootstrapping, we estimate the initial distribution of capital using the realized
values of Ki1 in each industry, from which we make random draws with replacement.
The extended model presented in Section 3.2 enables us to evaluate how much of the
variation in the innovation vector ηit that is due to Hicks-neutral eﬃciency shocks. We
propose the following relative variance measure, RV :
RV ≡
tr V ar

θA,1∆ ln(A∗it)

tr (Ση)
,
where θA,1 is the first column of θA, i.e. the loading vector of ln(A∗it) in (12). Since
∆ ln(A∗it) is orthogonal to the other latent factors, 1 − RV can be interpreted as the
relative variance of ∆ ln cit and ∆ ln bit, when combined into a single residual factor.
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6 Data and variable construction
We use a recently established database from Statistics Norway: the Capital database,
which contains annual observations on fixed capital (tangible fixed assets), costs of rented
capital (i.e. operational leasing), sales, wage costs, intermediates, man hours, and many
other variables for all Norwegian joint stock companies in the manufacturing sector for
the period 1993-200213. The main statistical unit in the database is the firm: A firm is
defined as ”the smallest legal unit comprising all economic activities engaged in by one
and the same owner” and corresponds in general to the concept of a company. A firm may
consist of one or more establishments. The establishment is the geographically local unit
doing economic activity within an industry class. The population of joint stock companies
comprises about 80% of total manufacturing employment in 2002 (but a much smaller
share of the total number of firms). The stock companies’ employment-weighted share of
the population of new firms is roughly the same. In this paper we analyze four relatively
high-tech sectors: Rubber and plastic products (NACE 25); Machinery and equipment
(NACE 29); Electrical and optical equipment (NACE 30-33), and Transport equipment
(NACE 34-35). See Appendix C for a listing of the NACE sector codes.
The database combines information from mainly two sources: Accounts statistics for
all Norwegian joint-stock companies, and Structural statistics for the manufacturing sec-
tor. Many of the variables in the database have been extensively revised and crosschecked
against diﬀerent data sources by Statistics Norway, including tax return forms. A very
important feature of the database, is that it contains measurements of net capital stocks
in both current and fixed prices.
The method for calculating the capital stocks in current prices is based on combining
book values from the financial accounts with gross investment data.14 Since our econo-
metric model contains a single aggregate capital variable, we have constructed this as
being proportional to the sum of the user cost of capital owned by the firm15 and the
13See ”Documentation of the capital database. A database with data for tangible
fixed assets and other economic data at the firm level,” which can be downloaded from:
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/10/90/doc_200416_en/doc_200416_en.pdf
14See Raknerud, Rønningen and Skjerpen (2003) for technical details and a thorough evaluation of the
data quality.
15Capital is divided into two groups of assets in the database: (i) Buildings and land (which have
long service lives) and (ii) Other tangible assets (with small or medium service lives). Separate user cost
estimates have been calculated for the two groups.
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total operational leasing costs. This is consistent with using a (constant returns to scale)
Cobb-Douglas aggregation function.
Our model contains four variables, which are measured on log-scale: sales, labor costs,
materials, and capital. Labor costs incorporate salaries and wages in cash and kind, social
security and other costs incurred by the employer. In general, all costs and revenues are
measured in nominal prices, and incorporate direct taxes and subsidies, except VAT. We
have not deflated the variables with available (industry wide) deflators as the econometric
model contains an industry wide time-varying intercept vector.
Following Caves’ (1998) survey of empirical findings on firm growth and turnover, we
have not stressed the distinction between a firm and an establishment.16 The unit of
observation in our data set is the firm. About 10-20 percent of the establishments belong
to multi-establishment firms in the sectors we consider.
Sometimes a firm may vanish from the database even if some of its establishments
are still operating. Our data indicate whether the disappearance of a firm is due to (i) a
close down of all production units or (ii) a merger, acquisition, or some other change of
ownership structure. Only (i) is counted as a firm exit as defined in Section 4, while (ii)
is considered as exogenous attrition.
Initially all firms in a sector that were operating during 1993-2002 were included in the
sample. For firms established before 1993, we introduced separate (nuisance) parameters
for the distribution of vi17, since vi for these firms is composed of both permanent dif-
ferences and cumulated innovations (up until 1993) and therefore has a diﬀerent meaning
than for firms established during 1993-2002. The focus of the analysis of firm hetero-
geneity is on firms established during the observation period. However, sometimes a firm
is registered as a new entrant to the industry although its establishments are old; for
example if a large firm is split into several smaller firms. Only a firm that consists of new
establishments (typically a single establishment firm) is considered as an entrant in this
study.
Some ”cleaning” of the data was performed. A firm was excluded from the sample if:
16Caves (1998) points out that most of the results on firm growth and turnover have been insensitive
to the establishment-firm distinction. This is not to deny that the distinction between firms (or lines-of-
business) and establishments raises interesting questions for our analysis. For instance, are there strong
correlations between eﬃciency levels across establishments within a firm? Do new establishments from
an existing firm have the same eﬃciency as new firms?
17That is, vi ∼ N (µv, hΣv)
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(i) the value of an endogenous variable is missing for two or more subsequent years; (ii)
the firm disappears from the raw data file and then reappears more than one time; or (iii)
the firm is observed in a single year only. These trimming procedures reduced the data
set by 10-15 percent. Some summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
7 Empirical results
This section, which presents our empirical results, is divided into three parts. First, we
examine the empirical validity of the structural models presented in Section 3. We find
that the single-factor model accounts quite well for the empirical patterns in all of the
industries. Nevertheless, allowance for labor augmenting innovations is needed in order
to explain the empirical autocorrelation patterns of labor productivity. We then show
that permanent diﬀerences dominate diﬀerences generated by cumulated, firm-specific
innovations in explaining observed firm heterogeneity. We also find that Hicks-neutral
innovations dominate labor augmenting innovations in explaining firm growth. Finally,
we examine the nature of sample self-selection.
7.1 The validity of the structural models
Table 2 presents the estimated eigenvalues from the factor decompositions described in
Section 4. The second column presents the estimated eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
for the idiosyncratic innovations, Ση, when no rank restrictions are imposed a priori. In
all the industries, the largest eigenvalue is at least an order of magnitude larger than the
second largest eigenvalue. The same pattern is present in the third column, presenting
the estimated eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the permanent diﬀerences, Σv.
These patterns of eigenvalues show that the persistent diﬀerences in performance can
largely be summarized by one latent factor determining all components of ηit and vi,
respectively. This conclusion is confirmed by the last columns of Tables 2 and 3, which
presents (pseudo-) R2-measures varying between .88 and .91 when no rank restrictions
are imposed on Ση and Σv (Table 2), and between .86 and .89 in the single-factor model
(Table 3)18. Thus, there is only a small increase in R2 when going from the rank-one to
18Our pseudo R2-measure is
R2 = 1− tr
gV ar(eit)
tr gV ar(yit − eθt)
,
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the rank-four model.
The fourth column in Table 2 depicts the eigenvalues of Σe, the covariance matrix
associated with transient shocks. The results show that the transient shocks are not
dominated by a single, common latent factor, in contrast to the persistent shocks. That
is, transient fluctuations are not common across the four endogenous variables. We no-
tice that the variance generated by the transient variance component is larger than the
variance of the innovation component in all industries: tr(Σe) > tr(Ση). The transient
fluctuations account for considerable mean reversion in the dynamic process for the ob-
servable variables, as pointed out in Section 4.
The single-factor model: The structural model presented in Section 3.1 does not only
impose a rank condition on Ση and Σv. These matrices should also have the structure
that follows from θA; see Section 3.1 and, in particular, (8) and (18). That is, the single-
factor model in Section 3.1 requires that the three first components within each loading
vector Γη and Γv should be the same. The estimates for the factor loadings Γη and Γv in
the single-factor model are presented in Table 3, with standard errors in parentheses.
Formal χ2-tests of the structural restrictions on Γη and Γv and on the capital coeﬃ-
cients, θK, are presented in Table 4. Except for a weak rejection of the restrictions on Γv
in the sector Electrical and optical equipment (NACE 30-33) and on the capital coeﬃ-
cients, θK, in the sector Machinery (NACE 29), the structural hypotheses are maintained
for the other three sectors. Considering the relatively large number of tests reported in
Table 4, the overall results can be seen as generally supportive of the one-factor model.
Nevertheless, not all aspects of the data are explained well by this simple model. First,
the second largest eigenvalues of Ση and Σv, albeit small, are clearly significant in all
sectors in view of the small standard errors. Thus, the hypothesis of a single latent factor
is rejected. One might be tempted to dismiss this conclusion, since it is well known that
the rejection of any null-hypothesis is only a question of having a suﬃciently large data
set19. On the other hand, it was noted already in Section 2 that Hicks-neutral eﬃciency
shocks cannot explain the autocorrelation pattern of labor productivity depicted in Figure
where eit = yit−E(vi+ait|yiτi , ..,yiTi)−eθK lnKi,t−1−eθt (the expectation is evaluated at the estimated
parameters and gV ar(·) denote the sample variance).
19See e.g. Leamer (1983) for a discussion of this issue.
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2.
Figure 4 elaborates on this point: The three lowest graphs in the figure show the
autocorrelation function of log labor productivity (conditional on survival) for: (i) the
actual data; (ii) the estimated single factor model (with no restrictions on the factor
loadings); and (iii) the estimated extended model (11) with three latent factors and with
the overidentifying restrictions (24) imposed on Γη.
We see that the single-factor model systematically underpredicts the empirical auto-
correlations, even if we have imposed no equality restrictions on its loading coeﬃcients.
Imposing such restrictions would make the situation even worse, as all autocorrelations
would become zero. On the other hand, the extended model fits the autocorrelations in
labor productivity remarkably well — with a possible exception at the first lag where the
empirical autocorrelation coeﬃcient is somewhat higher than predicted by the extended
model.
The upper three graphs in Figure 4 show the corresponding autocorrelation functions
for log sales. We first note that both econometric models fit the empirical autocorrelation
well. This may explain why the R2- measures reported in Table 2 and Table 3 are so
similar. Our assumption that persistent diﬀerences in firm performance evolves as a
random walk, in accordance with Gibrat’s law20, seems to be substantiated by the graphs
in Figure 4.
Let us now turn to the capital coeﬃcient estimates. First, we note that the loading
coeﬃcients of the latent variables in the capital accumulation equation reported in columns
2 and 3 of Table 3 is about 1/3 of the loading coeﬃcients in the sales and factor demand
equations. This indicates that an innovation which increases sales and factor demand
with 1 percent, increases the capital stock with around 0.3 percent. This is a significant
eﬀect, suggesting a clear link between innovations and investments.
The coeﬃcients of lagged capital, lnKi,t−1, in each of the four equations in the system
(7) are presented in the fourth column in Table 3. The coeﬃcients are around .7 in the
fourth (capital) equation in most sectors, which show that the speed of the adjustment of
capital towards its equilibrium is moderate. Price-taking behavior and constant returns
20The empirical literature suggests that Gibrat’s law is valid for large and medium sized firms. The
validity of Gibrat’s law for smaller firms depends on whether the analysis condition on survival. See
Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) for a discussion and further references.
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to scale imply that the coeﬃcient of lnKi,t−1 in the sales and factor demand equations,
γ/(1 − ε), should be equal to 1, while our estimates lie between .05 and .17. Thus, we
find clear evidence of diminishing returns to scale.
Even though we cannot identify the parameters γ and ε of the production function
(1), it is interesting to use the ”budget shares” eε = Si(wltLit + wmt Mit)/
S
i Sit and
eγ = Si(δ + r)qtKi,t−1/
S
i Sit as benchmarks, since these are widely used as estimators
in practice. We find that the budget shares obtained by lumping data of all the sectors
together are stable over time, with eε ≈ .9 and eγ ≈ .05, suggesting that γ/(1 − ε) ≈ .5.
The latter estimate seems too high to be consistent with our results. Therefore, the
assumption of price-taking behavior may not be plausible. It is interesting to note that in
the monopolistic competition model (11), the coeﬃcient of capital is: γ (e− 1) /(ε+e−eε),
which is small when the price elasticity of demand, e, is large. For example: ε = .9,
γ = .05, and e = 3.5, gives a coeﬃcient of capital equal to .1, which is in the middle
of our range of capital coeﬃcient estimates. Earlier studies on Norwegian manufacturing
data also provide evidence of imperfect competition and market power in many industries
(see Klette, 1999).
The extended model: The extended model (11) contains three latent factors: the
Hicks-neutral eﬃciency parameter, lnA∗it (which also incorporates demand idiosyncracies
due to quality diﬀerences between diﬀerent producers), the variable factor price index,
ln cit, and the labor augmenting parameter, ln bit. It was noted in Section 3 that labor
productivity will depend on ln cit and ln bit, but not on lnA∗it. Based on the identifying
restrictions discussed in Section 4 and Appendix B, we are able to identify the structural
coeﬃcient matrix θA up to an unknown scale coeﬃcient for each column. That is, we are
able to identify the following parameters:
hθ1 =
(e− 1)
ε+ e− eεσA,
hθ2 = −
ε(e− 1)
ε+ e− eεσc,
hθ3 =

− ε(e− 1)ε+ e− eε +
ρ
1− ρ

σc
hθ4 =
ρ
1− ρσb,
hθ5 = (1− φ)κAσA, hθ6 = (1− φ)κcσc,
σcb = Corr(ln cit, ln bit).
The estimates are depicted in Table 5. The coeﬃcients of lnKi,t−1 are identical to the
estimates in Table 3 up to two decimal places, and are therefore not reported.
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First, we note that in all sectors the estimated loading coeﬃcient of lnA∗it in the first
three equations, hθ1, is a weighted average of the three first components of Γη reported
in Table 3. Moreover, the estimated coeﬃcient of lnA∗it in the capital equation, hθ5, is
very close to the fourth component of Γη in all sectors. With respect to the other latent
factors, our results indicate that hθ4 < 0 in all sectors, except in Plastics (NACE 25). Thus,
labor augmenting innovations are mostly labor saving, since hθ4 < 0 is equivalent with
ρ < 0. Note that hθ4 < 0 is equivalent with hθ3 < hθ2, which holds also for the estimated
parameters. The estimates of σcb in Table 5 shows that the labor augmenting parameter,
ln bit, and the variable factor price index, ln cit, are highly negatively correlated, as we
expected. Finally, the last column of Table 5 reports the result of a χ2-test (with 2
degrees of freedom) of the overidentifying restrictions embedded in the extended model.
The overidentifying restrictrions are maintained in all sectors.
7.2 Permanent diﬀerences dominate
We can now examine the origin and evolution of diﬀerences in performance across firms.
Table 6 presents measures of the magnitude of permanent diﬀerences and diﬀerences gen-
erated by cumulated innovations within each of the four industries based on the estimated
extended model. Column 2 presents the ratio of the trace of the variance-covariance ma-
trix of the permanent diﬀerences, tr(Σv), to the trace of the variance-covariance matrix of
the cumulated innovations, tr(Ση). This ratio shows how many years innovations must be
accumulated in order to account for as much of the heterogeneity as the permanent diﬀer-
ences. These figures lie between 12 and 31, showing that permanent diﬀerences dominate
over idiosyncratic innovations in the cohort of firms established in 1993 in all sectors.
These results do not, however, provide a fully satisfactory measure of the importance
of permanent diﬀerences in explaining the observed variation in firm performance, since
they neglect the issue of exit and self-selection. We argued in Section 5 that a better
measure is provided by the conditional variance ratio, CVT . The conditional variance
ratio among firms surviving from 1993 until (at least) 2002 is presented in column 4
for each industry. The conditional variance ratios vary from 1.6 in Machinery (NACE
29) to 3.0 in Electrical and optical equipment (NACE 30-33). The pattern from the
previous columns remains, i.e. the variance of the permanent diﬀerences is larger than
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the variance in the cumulated, idiosyncratic innovations in all industries. We also find that
the conditional variance ratios are somewhat lower than the corresponding unconditional
variance ratios presented in column 3.
Finally, as explained in Section 5, the variance ratio RV measures the relative impor-
tance of Hicks-neutral innovations, i.e. shocks in lnA∗it, for firm growth. The results in
the last column of Table 6, show that Hicks-neutral eﬃciency shocks account for between
70-80 percent of the variance in cumulated innovations. This explains why labor pro-
ductivity, which is correlated with ∆ ln bit and ∆ ln cit, but not ∆ lnA∗it, are only weakly
related to firm growth, as depicted in Figure 3.
7.3 Sample self-selection
Table 7 presents likelihood ratio tests of the hypotheses that ρ = 0 and λ = 0 for the
model with one latent factor in ηit and vi. The estimated correlation between the inno-
vation, ηi,t+1, and firm exit in year t is negative. A likelihood ratio test of the restriction
that this correlation is zero: ρ = 0, is presented in the second column in Table 7 and
is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance in all industries. Thus there is signifi-
cant selection systematically eliminating firms with low eﬃciency21. On the other hand,
the results in the third column of Table 7 show that there is no connection between the
transitory error term, eit, and firm exit (conditional on the observed variables xit).
The values of the χ2 statistics in Table 7 change little when going from the single-
factor model, to the extended model. We find that self-selection is significantly related to
Hicks-neutral innovations, but not to the other latent factors.
In all industries we find a negative correlation between the permanent eﬃciency levels,
vi, and the subsequent innovations, aiT , among surviving firms. Our interpretation of
this negative correlation is that a firm with a low permanent eﬃciency level must have a
high growth in eﬃciency in its subsequent years in order to survive and vice versa. That
is to say, selection is based on the firm’s overall eﬃciency, which is the combination of the
permanent eﬃciency levels and the innovations.
21Similar findings have been presented in a number of studies, as surveyed by Foster, Haltiwanger and
Krizan (2001). However, our measurement of eﬃciency diﬀers from the previous studies. The negative
correlation between the probability of exit and a firm’s productivity level has not been striking in previous
studies of Norwegian manufacturing firms, see Møen (1998).
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8 Conclusion
This paper examines the large diﬀerences across firms in terms of sales and demand
for labor, materials and capital. With firm level observations from four manufacturing
industries covering 10 years, we showed that most of the diﬀerences in sales and factor
demands can be accounted for by a structural model with price-taking behavior, fully
optimizing supply and factor demand, and a simple production function with Hicks-
neutral eﬃciency shocks.
Nevertheless, the relatively low estimated output and input elasticities of capital, in-
dicate that the assumption of price taking behavior is too simple. A more satisfactory
model is one of monopolistic competition, allowing diﬀerences both in eﬃciency and prod-
uct characteristics — e.g. quality diﬀerences — across diﬀerent producers within the sector.
Furthermore, in order too account for persistent diﬀerences in labor productivity across
firms, we are led to include a labor-augmenting latent factor in the production func-
tion. We find that Hicks-neutral innovations dominate labor augmenting innovations in
explaining firm growth.
The structural model enables us to investigate the origin and evolution of the diﬀer-
ences in performance across firms. The empirical results show that permanent diﬀerences
dominate among the firms established within the 10-year period we consider, as they ex-
ceed diﬀerences in cumulated innovations by a factor ranging between about 1.5 and 3.
across the four high-tech industries.
The most striking and controversial result from our analysis is its implications for
eﬃciency measurement. We argue that size is a better indicator of eﬃciency than labor
productivity, as long as we also account for the fixity of capital. It is well known that
diﬀerences in firm size should reflect diﬀerences in eﬃciency, while the serious problem
we point out with labor productivity as a measure of eﬃciency diﬀerences seems to have
been largely neglected in the literature22.
22See, however, Bernard et al. (2000) and Klette and Kortum (2004).
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Appendix A: Estimation
In order to derive the full likelihood function, we re-write the system (29) using properties
of multivariate regression:
zi,t+1 = ρεit +Mhzi,t+1
eit = λεit − λ(M−1ρ)hzi,t+1 + heit
where hzi,t+1 ∼ IN (0, I), M is lower triangular, heit ∼ IN(0, hΣe) and εit, hzit and heit are
white noise and independent of each other. Defining hΓη = ΓηM and hρ = M−1ρ, we can
write:
Xi1 ≡ yi1 − θK lnKi,0 − θ1 = vi+ei1
= Γvzi1 − λhρhzi2 + λεi1 + hei1
Xit ≡ ∆yit − θK∆ lnKi,t−1 −∆θt = Γηzit + eit − ei,t−1
= (hΓηhρ−λ)εi,t−1 + λεit+(hΓη+λhρ)hzit−λhρhzi,t+1+heit−hei,t−1
Now, define:
Xi = (Xi1
, ...,XiTi
)
εi = (εi1 , ..., εiTi )
zi = (zi1
,hzi2 , ...,hzi,Ti+1 )
ei = (hei1 , ...,heiTi ) .
Then
εi ∼ N (0, IdTi)
zi ∼ N (0, Ir(Ti+1))
ei ∼ N (0, ITi ⊗ hΣe)
For firm i it is now possible to write the model as a simultaneous equation system as
follows:
Xi = Azi +Bεi +Cei
where
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Γv −λhρ 0 · · · 0
0 hΓη+λhρ −λhρ · · · 0
... · · · . . . . . . ...
0 · · · 0 hΓη+λhρ −λhρ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
B =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ 0 · · · 0
hΓηhρ−λ λ · · · 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · hΓηhρ−λ λ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
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C =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
Id 0 · · · 0
−Id Id
. . .
...
...
. . . . . .
...
0 · · · −Id Id
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
We see that Xi given zi has the distribution
Xi|zi ∼ N (Azi,BB +C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C)
Although the dimension of the covariance matrix is dTi, and hence increases with the
number of observations Ti, there are no numerical problems involved here. The reason is
that this matrix is block-tridiagonal, and hence its inversion requires onlyO(Ti) operations
(rather than the usual O(T 3i ) for general matrices).
Since
∂ ln f(Xi,εi|zi)
∂εi

εi=E(εi|Xi,zi)
= 0
Var(εi|Xi, zi) = −
∂2 ln f(Xi, εi|zi)
∂εi∂εi
−1
≡ Ω
we obtain
εi| (Xi, zi) ∼ N (ΩB
k
C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C

l−1
[Xi −Azi],Ω)
Ω−1 = B
k
C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C
l−1
B+ ITi
To obtain Ω, one needs to invert Ω−1, which is non-sparse. However, from a well-known
matrix inversion lemma, we have
Ω =

B
k
C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C
l−1
B+ ITi
−1
= ITi −B
k
C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C +BB
l−1
B
which only requires inversion of the block-tridiagonal matrix C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C +BB.
If we define
εi =

χi1(γ Ayi1 + γxxi1 + γ1), ...,χiTi(γ AyiTi + γxxiTi + γTi)

(note that χiTi = 1 for t < Ti) we obtain:
f(Xi,χiTi|zi) = f(Xi|zi)
U
εi≤εi f(ε|Xi, zi) dεi
∝ |BB +C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C|−
1
2 exp

−1
2
(Xi −Azi)

BB +C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C
−1
(Xi −Azi)

×
Prob(ν i ≤ εi −ΩB
k
C(ITi ⊗ hΣe)C
l−1
[Xi −Azi])
(33)
where νi∼ N (0,Ω).Computation of the multivariate normal probability in (33) is, of
course, far from trivial. We apply the GHK smooth recursive simulator, which is both
fast and simple to implement for our problem; see Hajivassiliou et al., 1996.
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Finally, to obtain the likelihood function we need to ”integrate out” zi:
f(Xi,χiTi) =
]
f(Xi,χi|zi)
1
(
√
2π)r(Ti+1)
exp(−1
2
zi
zi )dz i
* 1
S
S[
s=1
f(Xi,χiTi|z(s)i )
where z(s)i is the s
th random draw from the standard multivariate normal distribution
for firm i, and S is the number of draws.
If we now define
l
(s)
i (θ) = ln
f(Xi,χi|z(s))
S
li(θ) = ln
S[
s=1
exp(l
(s)
i (θ))
l(θ) =
[
i
li(θ)
This gives
l(θ) *
[
i
ln f(Xi,χi)
∂l(θ)
∂θ =
[
i
∂li(θ)
∂θ =
[
i
[
s
exp(l
(s)
i (θ))
exp(li(θ))
∂l(s)i (θ)
∂θ
=
[
i
[
s
∂l(s)i (θ)
∂θ ω
(s)
i
Although obtaining the derivatives ∂l
(s)
i (θ)
∂θ are cumbersome, analytic expressions are
available for all these derivatives by using well-know matrix-derivatives rules (see Lutke-
pohl (1996)). Hence an eﬃcient quasi-Newton algorithm can be applied to solve the
estimation problem.
Appendix B: Proof of equation (25)-(26).
From (14), (15) and (22), it follows that
Γηzit = θA∆αit.
Under the assumption of normality and independence of ∆ lnA∗it and (∆ ln cit,∆ ln bit),
we can write:
θA∆αit = θASDzit, where zit ∼ N (0, I3),
where S and D are defined in (23) and (26). Then, Γη = θASDR, and zit = Rzit, for
some orthonormal matrix R (see Anderson, 1984). We must show that R = I3.
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We have
θAS =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(e−1)
ε+e−eεσA −
ε(e−1)
ε+e−eεσc 0
(e−1)
ε+e−eεσA

− ε(e−1)ε+e−eε +
ρ
1−ρ

σc 0
(e−1)
ε+e−eεσA

− ε(e−1)ε+e−eε +
ρ
1−ρ

σc ρ1−ρσb
(1− φ)κAσA (1− φ)κcσc 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
hθ1 hθ2 0
hθ1 hθ3 0
hθ1 hθ3 hθ4
hθ5 hθ6 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (34)
Let
R =
⎡
⎣
r11 r12 r13
r21 r22 r23
r31 r32 r33
⎤
⎦ .
Now consider the equation Γη = θASDR:
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
γ1 γ2 0
γ1 γ3 0
γ1 γ4 γ5
γ6 γ7 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
hθ1 hθ2 0
hθ1 hθ3 0
hθ1 hθ3 hθ4
hθ5 hθ6 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎣
1 0 0
0 1
0 σcb
s
1− σ2cb
⎤
⎦R (35)
Since R is orthonormal, we easily find that R = I3. Solving (35) with respect to hθ1, ...,hθ6
and σcb, then gives a unique solution when we require that σcb < 0 and hθ2 < 0 (which
follows from (34)).
Appendix C: NACE sector codes
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
30. Manufacture of oﬃce machinery and computers
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and appa-
ratus
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and
clocks
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
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Appendix D: Some theoretical ideas on firm hetero-
geneity
We decompose the persistent diﬀerences in firm performance into (i) permanent diﬀerences
that are established already when the firm enters an industry, and (ii) diﬀerences that
are generated through subsequent, idiosyncratic innovations that accumulate through the
firms’ life-time23. In this appendix, we briefly review the main ideas in the theoretical lit-
erature emphasizing eﬃciency diﬀerences permanent to the firms and diﬀerences evolving
through innovations that are cumulated, respectively.
The importance of permanent diﬀerences in eﬃciency: Which theoretical models
can explain large permanent diﬀerences across firms that are introduced already when the
firms enter the industry? An old idea is the so-called putty-clay model, emphasizing the
irreversible nature of a firm’s choice of technology. The classical contribution is Johansen
(1959)24. The putty-clay literature emphasizes that choices of technology are embodied
in the capital, which makes adjustment costly as it requires that the existing capital must
be replaced.
Recent case studies of the life cycle of firms suggest that organizational capital can be
as diﬃcult and costly to adjust as physical capital; see e.g. Holbrook, Cohen, Hounshell
and Klepper (2000), Carroll and Hannan (2000), Jovanovic (2001) and Jovanovic and
Rousseau (2001). For instance, Holbrook et al. document the development of four of
the dominating firms in the early history of the semiconductor industry. Their analysis
explains how these firms had a hard time adjusting to the new circumstances as the
industry evolved, and eventually all the firms failed and were closed down.
Large costs associated with adjustment of the organizational capital has also been
a recurrent theme in studies of the productivity eﬀects of new information technology.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) emphasize that implementing new, IT-based just-in-time
production requires simultaneous and costly adjustments in a number of distinct and
complementary technological and organizational components in order to be productive.
Similar findings have emerged in a number of recent firm level studies examining the
(often small) productivity gains from IT-investments; see the survey by Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2000).
That re-adjustments of organizational capital are costly and diﬃcult to implement
successfully is not surprising in the light of recent advances in the theory of incentives
in firms and organizations. This research has revealed how firms are operated through a
complicated system of explicit, formal contracts and informal, relational contracts, and
why such a system is costly to adjust and renegotiate; see Gibbons (2000).
Finally, we should mention the study by Jovanovic (1982). His study links diﬀerences
23In his review of models of firm growth and heterogeneity, Sutton (1997) emphasizes essentially the
same distinction, i.e. between models where firm heterogeneity is driven either by ”intrinsic eﬃciency
diﬀerences” or by ”random outcomes emanting from R&D programs”. The distinction between intrinsic
diﬀerences and innovations has also been prominent in labor economics, where the two components are
referred to as heterogeneity and state dependence, respectively. See e.g. Heckman (1991).
24See Førsund and Hjalmarsson (1987), Lambson (1992) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) for further
references to subsequent research.
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in firm productivity to diﬀerences in the skills of the firms’ entrepreneur. The simple
and basic idea is that more eﬃcient entrepreneurs command larger firms. This model of
firm heterogeneity was introduced by Lucas (1978). It was extended by Jovanovic who
introduced entrepreneurial uncertainty about their relative eﬃciency which is gradually
resolved as the entrepreneur learns from the performance of his firm. Jovanovic’s model
has had considerable empirical success, as it provides an explanation for the high degree of
turbulence and high exit rate among young firms. The basic idea that eﬃciency diﬀerences
are permanent characteristics embedded in the firms as they are established, is in line with
the ideas discussed in this section.
The present study does not aim at discriminating among these various theories which
all emphasize the important role of permanent eﬃciency diﬀerences across firms. Instead,
this brief survey is provided to remind the reader why diﬀerences that are introduced
when the firms are born may in principle have a considerable influence on subsequent
firm performance.
Firm growth through cumulated innovations: Another line of research has focused
on diﬀerences in firm performance driven by idiosyncratic and cumulated innovations.
The basic idea is that firm performance is driven by firm specific learning, R&D, and
innovation, involving significant randomness. This line of ideas emphasizes that a firm’s
relative eﬃciency and market share slowly, but gradually changes over time.
Early research on firm heterogeneity was stimulated by Gibrat’s analysis of the skewed
size-distribution of firms, and how such skewed size-distributions can be generated from
independent firm growth processes. These growth processes are characterized, according
to the so-called Gibrat’s law, by firm growth rates that are independent of firm size.
Simon and his co-authors developed this line of research in the 1960s and 1970s, by
exploring firm evolution through formal modelling of the stochastic processes; see Ijiri
and Simon (1977). While this early work paid little attention to optimizing behavior and
interactions between firms, Hopenhayn (1992) presents a related study of an industry
equilibrium generated by interacting and optimizing firms. Firm growth is driven by
exogenous stochastic processes, with exit as an endogenous decision25.
Gibrat’s legacy has recently had a revival, not least due to the work by Sutton (1997,
1998). Sutton shows how persistent diﬀerences in firm size and a concentrated market
structure tend to emerge in models imposing only mild assumptions on the innovation
activities in large versus small firms. His work recognizes the essential role of innovation
and R&D in explaining large and persistent diﬀerences e.g. in firm sizes, but his model
deliberately contains little structure, as he searches for robust patterns which are indepen-
dent of the detailed model structure. A somewhat more structured model of firm growth
through learning and innovation is provided by Ericson and Pakes (1995).
Other recent studies of firm growth emphasizing endogenous learning and innovation,
have imposed tight structures on their models in terms of the role of R&D and the nature
of the innovation process; see Klepper (1996), Klette and Griliches (2000) and Klette and
25Hopenhayn’s model accounts for diﬀerences in initial conditions, as well as idiosyncratic innovations
during the firms’ life cycles. Our empirical framework is in large parts consistent with his model of firm
evolution.
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Kortum (2004). These studies confront stylized facts that have emerged from a large
number of empirical studies of R&D, innovation and firm growth.
The common theme across all these models is that firm growth can be considered as
stochastic processes, with idiosyncratic innovations, and a high degree of persistence.
In the rest of this study we examine the relative, quantitative importance of perma-
nent diﬀerences on the one hand and cumulated innovations on the other, as sources of
persistent firm heterogeneity. Clearly, this is only a first step and subsequent research
will aim at discriminating among the theories within each of these line of research.
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Standard deviation in parenthesis
Sector (NACE) # of firms/entrants Mean log of output∗ Mean log of lab.prod∗∗ # of empl.
Plastics (25) 367/126 7.78 (1.32) −1.60 (.54) 13.8 (25.6)
Machinery (29) 1227/548 7.73 (1.34) −1.61 (.52) 15.0 (32.2)
Electrical inst. (30-33) 785/342 7.76 (1.35) −1.55 (.54) 16.5 (44.1)
Transp. eq. (34-35) 795/316 8.26 (1.45) −1.65 (.46) 32.8 (94.5)
∗ Value added deflated by the consumer price index.
∗∗ Value added per hours worked.
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Table 2: Estimates of eigenvalues and pseudo R2 in model with four latent
factors Standard errors in parenthesis.
Sector (NACE) Eigenv. of Ση Eigenv. of Σv Eigenv. of Σe Pseudo R2
(Idiosyncratic innov.) (Permanent diﬀerences) (Noise)
Plastics (25)
.233 (.021)
.033 (.002)
.001 (.001)
.000 (.001)
4.03 (.48)
.22 (.04)
.02 (.01)
.00 (.01)
.36
.09
.01
.00
0.90
Machinery (29)
.288 (.013)
.027 (.001)
.002 (.001)
.000 (.001)
4.10 (.29)
.39 (.03)
.03 (.01)
.00 (.01)
.50
.10
.02
.01
0.88
Electrical Inst. (30-33)
.220 (.019)
.023 (.003)
.002 (.001)
.000 (.001)
6.23 (.42)
.42 (.04)
.05 (.02)
.00 (.01)
.50
.06
.03
.01
0.91
Transp. Eq. (34-35)
.347 (.029)
.041 (.003)
.005 (.001)
.000 (.001)
4.82 (.33)
.64 (.07)
.04 (.01)
.01 (.01)
.45
.11
.04
.01
0.91
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Table 3: Estimates of factor loadings and capital coeﬃcients in single factor
model. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Sector (NACE) Idiosyn. inn. Permanent dif. Capital coef. Pseudo R2
Estim. (st.dev.) Estim. (st.dev.) Estim. (st.dev.)
Plastics (25)
.27(.02)
.26 (.05)
.23 (.07)
.11 (.03)
1.13 (.06)
1.25 (.16)
1.02 (.18)
.37 (.08)
.13 (.07)
.09 (.07)
.15 (.08)
.72 (.05)
0.89
Machinery (29)
.28(.02)
.29 (.03)
.31 (.04)
.10 (.02)
1.09 (.02)
1.18 (.05)
1.18 (.06)
.33 (.01)
.11 (.04)
.09 (.04)
.10 (.04)
.70 (.03)
0.86
Electrical Inst. (30-33)
.25(.01)
.25 (.03)
.27 (.04)
.08 (.02)
1.35 (.05)
1.48 (.15)
1.40 (.20)
.50 (.02)
.08 (.04)
.05 (.04)
.05 (.04)
.64 (.03)
0.89
Transp. Eq. (34-35)
.30(.03)
.32(.11)
.33 (.13)
.08 (.02)
1.22 (.11)
1.28 (.44)
1.26 (.50)
.36 (.06)
.15(.06)
.16 (.07)
.17 (.08)
.71 (.03)
0.87
41
Table 4: Testing structural restrictions on loading coeﬃcients and capital co-
eﬃcients in single factor model.
Sector (NACE) Restrictions Γη Restrictions Γv Restrictions θK
χ2 d.f. P-value χ2 d.f. P-value χ2 d.f. P-value
Plastics (25) .46 2 .79 .26 2 .87 2.74 2 .25
Machinery (29) .03 2 .98 2.51 2 .28 9.00 2 .01
Electrical Inst. (30-33) .20 2 .90 7.69 2 .02 4.21 2 .12
Transp. Eq. (34-35) .48 2 .78 2.02 2 .36 .25 2 .87
Table 5: Estimates of the extended model and test of overidentifying restric-
tions.
Sector (NACE) Parameter estimates χ2-test
hθ1 hθ2 hθ3 hθ4 hθ5 hθ6 σcb P-value
Plastics (25) .26 −.07 .02 .22 .10 −.04 −.63 .12
Machinery (29) .28 −.01 −.09 −.19 .10 .00 −.57 .08
Elect. In. (30-33) .25 −.01 −.08 −.21 .07 .00 −.58 .09
Tran. Eq. (34-35) .30 −.05 −.15 −.26 .07 −.01 −.57 .17
Table 6: Measures of the origins of firm heterogeneity. The unconditional variance
ratio (V), the conditional variance ratio (CV) and the relative variance (RV). Estimates
from the extended model.
Sector (NACE) T ∗ = tr V ar(Σv)tr V ar(Ση) V CV RV
Plastics (25) 19.2 2.04 1.68 .79
Machinery (29) 12.5 1.70 1.62 .82
Electr. inst. (30-33) 31.1 3.45 3.04 .77
Transp. eq. (34-35) 16.1 1.76 1.58 .70
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Table 7: Testing of the missing at random assumption
Sector (NACE) Zero restrictions ρ Zero restrictions λ
χ2 d.f. P-value χ2 d.f. P-value
Plastics (25) 5.74 1 .02 1.16 4 .88
Machinery (29) 12.0 1 .00 2.68 4 .61
Electrical Inst. (30-33) 7.81 1 .00 4.96 4 .30
Transp. Eq. (34-35) 3.70 1 .05 8.25 4 .09
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Figure 1: Diﬀerences in log sales as a function of firm age. Triangles indicates the
means and the vertical lines show the interquartile range.
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Figure 2: The correlation between relative performance in a firm’s first year
and in its subsequent years. The squares correspond to the correlation coeﬃcents for
(log) sales while the triangles refer to (log) labor productivity.
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Figure 3: Diﬀerences in log labor productivity as a function of firm age. Triangles
indicate the means and the vertical lines show the interquartile range.
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Figure 4: Autocorrelation functions (ACF) for log of labor productivity (lnLP)
and log of sales (lnS).
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